



Preventing CW and BW Proliferation: The Australia Group

23rd Asian Export Control Seminar
Tokyo, 23-25 February 2016

Jane Hardy, Australia Group Chair
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia



Overview

- Australia Group origins
- Proliferation still occurring
- Australia Group objectives
- How the Australia Group works
- The Australia Group in Asia
- Challenges
- Australia Group assistance





Australia Group Origins

- In 1984 the world discovered Iraq had produced and used chemical weapons
- Australia Group Created in 1985 to stop legitimate trade being diverted to chemical weapons production



Australia Group Origins

- Informal forum of countries
- Group adopted common licensing measures to ensure exported goods did not assist chemical weapons programs
- Grown from 16 to 42 participants
- Controls expanded to include biological weapons



Proliferation still occurring


- Examples
 - Syria
 - Da'esh (Islamic State)



Australia Group Objectives

- Harmonise national export controls to limit the risks of proliferation and terrorism involving chemical and biological weapons
- Help states meet their international obligations to control sensitive exports:
 - Chemical Weapons Convention
 - Biological Weapons Convention
 - UN Security Council Resolution 1540





How the Australia Group Works

- Guidelines
- Control Lists – sensitive items
 - Chemical weapons precursors;
 - Human and Animal pathogens and toxins;
 - Plant pathogens;
 - Dual-use chemical manufacturing equipment and related technology;
 - Dual-use biological equipment and related technology.



Australia Group website

Statement by the Chair of the 2015 Australia Group Plenary

5 June 2015

The 41 Member Countries of the Australia Group (AG) and the European Union marked the Group's 30th anniversary at the Plenary meeting in Perth this week. The Australia Group was formed after the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War. Its work aims to counter the spread of technologies and materials used for chemical and biological weapons (CBW) and outreach.

During the meeting, Members emphasised the need to implement export controls on such materials and technology. Export controls also help reduce the diversion of legitimate technology.

Among the measures Australia Group non-proliferation were:

- Intensifying the Australia Group's outreach to highlight the threat and know-how to develop

Consideration was given to the group's approach to future

Export Control List: Chemical Weapons Precursors

Precursor Chemical	CAS No.	CWC Schedule
Vinodiglycol	(111-18-8)	2B
Phosphorus oxychloride	(10025-87-3)	3B
Dimethyl methylphosphonate	(756-74-6)	2B
Methylphosphonyl difluoride (DF)	(676-09-3)	1B
Methylphosphonyl dichloride (DC)	(676-97-1)	2B
Dimethyl phosphite (DMP)	(868-33-9)	3B
Phosphorus trichloride	(7719-12-2)	3D
Dimethyl phosphite (DMP)	(121-45-9)	3B
Thionyl chloride	(7719-09-7)	3B
3-Hydroxy-1-methylpiperidine	(3554-74-3)	Not Listed
N,N-Diisopropyl-(beta)-aminoethyl chloride	(96-79-7)	2B
N,N-Diisopropyl-(beta)-aminoethane thiol	(5842-07-9)	2B
3-Quinuclidinol	(1619-34-7)	2B
Potassium fluoride	(7789-23-3)	Not Listed
2-Chloroethanol	(107-11-3)	Not Listed
Dimethylamine	(124-40-3)	Not Listed
Diethyl ethylphosphonate	(78-38-6)	2B
Diethyl N,N-dimethylphosphoramidate	(2404-01-7)	2B
Diethyl phosphite	(767-14-9)	3B
Dimethylamine hydrochloride	(506-59-2)	Not Listed

Australia Group Common Control List Handbook

Volume II: Biological Weapons-Related Common Control Lists



Australia Group Common Control List Handbook

Volume I: Chemical Weapons-Related Common Control Lists



www.australiagroup.net





How the Australia Group Works

- The Australia Group aims to ensure export controls do not hinder legitimate trade
- Export controls legitimise the vast majority of regular trade in sensitive items
- There are very few Australia Group export denials



How the Australia Group Works

- Regular meetings
- Consensus based



Australia Group Plenary, Perth June 2015





2015 Australia Group Plenary

- Held in Perth to mark the 30th Anniversary
- The Plenary decided to
 - Increase its focus on emerging technologies that could be used for chemical/biological weapons
 - Expand outreach to non-members countries, industry and academia
 - highlighting the threat of state and non-state actors acquiring chemical/biological weapons



The Australia Group in Asia

- The Australia Group encourages all countries to implement measures similar to AG controls to limit the spread of CBW.



The Australia Group in Asia



- Export controls help states meet their international obligations (CWC, BWC, UNSCR 1540)
- Exporting countries look positively on recipient states that have export control arrangements
- High-technology companies are more likely to invest in states that have robust export control arrangements



The Australia Group in Asia



- Many countries in the region already implement AG or AG-type controls
- Several more are looking to implement such export controls in the near future
- Encourage countries to become AG adherents



The Australia Group in Asia



- AG engagement and outreach:
 - Briefings by Australian diplomatic officials
 - Visits by AG delegations
 - Presentations and discussions at international or regional meetings
 - AG Dialogues



Challenges



- Technology (e.g. advances in biological sciences)
- Methods of trade (e.g. internet, eBay)
- Intangible transfers of technology (e.g. electronic transfer of knowledge)
- Terrorism





Australia Group assistance

- The Australia Group Chair and Secretariat can assist with:
 - Providing information about the Australia Group
 - Facilitating specific requests for practical technical assistance
 - Facilitating contacts with export control experts in Australia Group countries



Australia Group contact

- Australia Group Secretariat
 - through any Australian Embassy
- Australia Group website
 - www.australiagroup.net
 - in English, Arabic, Chinese, French, German, Russian and Spanish

